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Rapt in Technology 
 
Aidan Davison 
 
I.  
pity this busy monster,manunkind, 
 
not.   Progress is a comfortable disease: 
your victim(death and life safely beyond) 
—e.e.cummings XIV, 1 x 1, 19441 
 
Given the energy expended within dominant Cartesian epistemologies constructing and policing 
conceptual boundaries between the natural and the cultural—energies joined, paradoxically, to 
the pragmatic Baconian colonisation of nature—the terms ‘environment’ and ‘technology’ have 
come to share an interesting convergence.  
 
First, both have become amorphous and diffuse, referring to ubiquitous conditions in human 
experience. Langdon Winner’s pronouncement in 1977 that technology “has come to mean 
everything and anything; it therefore threatens to mean nothing”2 is relevant still. It is 
increasingly true also of the functioning of the term environment, an observation that goes some 
way in explaining the centrifugal forces currently disintegrating and dispersing environmental 
discourses.3 
 
Second, these domains of everywhere have been progressively objectified, squeezing out of 
language the possibilities of negotiation and leaving mostly description. The objectification of 
technology has been little resisted, a fact evident in the neglect of this subject, until recent times, 
by philosophers and social theorists.4 Even with non-technical literatures on the meanings of 
technology emerging since the 1960s, the instrumentalism of engineering discourse and practice 
continues to determine the focus and depth of political debate about technological change. In 
wider culture, instrumentalism competes with the equally objectifying capacities of technological 
determinism that presents artefacts not as socially neutral, but as somehow inherently good or 
evil.5  
 
In contrast, objection to the objectification of nature has been a foundational historical force in 
the critique and yet also the unfolding of modern Western traditions.6 Awareness of the 
interdependence of instrumentalism and romanticism in post-Enlightenment narratives of 
nature—to put it in neat, if dangerously convenient, terms—moves us further toward active 
understandings of the sources of disorder and confusion in contemporary environmental 
discourses. On the one hand, as we build and inhabit ever-more hybridised environments, 
expressions of the aesthetic, moral, and spiritual values of nature are intensifying, but becoming 
typed as subjective and, as such, as essentially private concerns to be expressed by consumers as 
lifestyle preferences. On the other hand, as the domains of environmental science, environmental 
engineering, and environmental management grow year by year, public reference points in the 
idea of ‘environment’ outside of empiricism seem harder to maintain.7 Here nature becomes ‘the 
environment’, a biophysical unity existing outside of, before and beyond, culture and experience. 
The prior historical mosaic of technological environments becomes ‘the environment’, a global 
device for human survival in plain view to the Apollo astronauts and contained within the 
heaven-born photographs that have provoked awareness of earth’s finiteness and fragility ever 
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since. But although ‘the environment’ can now be seen as a single fact, as a whole, increasingly it 
can only be rationally spoken as ever smaller parts existing within specialist discourses that 
themselves fracture into ever more pointed splinters of biophysical fact.  
 
The juxtaposition of the tedious rationalism of conventional scholars and the absurd—if 
sometimes unwittingly amusing—sibling squabbles amongst radical scholars within the field of 
environmental ethics; the growing proliferation of competing environmentalisms in general; and 
the universal availability of the lexicon of sustainability are three important indications of the 
lack of critical gravity in understandings of ‘the environment’. The pursuit of the ‘natural’ in 
consumer product design in everything from ecotourism to real estate to shampoo, with its 
attendant market premium, is, in a different way, another. 
 
 
 
II.  
plays with the bigness of his littleness 
—electrons deify one razorblade 
into a mountainrange;lenses extend 
 
unwish through curving wherewhen till unwish 
returns on its unself. 
   A world of made 
is not a world of born—pity poor flesh 
 
The expansiveness of scope and narrowness of consciousness characteristic of objectivist 
understandings of the terms ‘technology’ and ‘environment’ produces a vacuum in political 
imagination. Framed in this way, the theme of technology-as-environment illuminates little not 
already easily in view. As a statement of description, it is undeniably true: these two categories 
are now indivisible. The webbing of artefacts into a technosphere as integral to the conditions of 
life as the ecosphere is an event. Nature, thought as a-technological earth, is undeniably dead, 
although one of the vital tasks of the practices of simulacra is now precisely to keep this thought 
alive.8 The ‘artefactual natures’ to be found in television documentaries, photographic posters, 
and zoos deify ‘pure natures’ just as they enclose them. Consider that, their ecological brethren 
apparently pursued to extinction in the first-half of last century, images of the Tasmanian Tiger, 
now freely inhabit beer labels, tourist brochures, and government letterhead as proof of the 
celebrated status of the ‘wild’ in my home-state (“the natural state,” no less, broadcast Tiger-
adorned car-licence plates). Hope swings fluidly between another sighting and the possibility that 
cloning may see the beast brought back through the portal of the laboratory.9  
The fact of earth’s mortality, just as with the related fact of our own mortality, is a sobering and 
potentially terrifying one. It is not surprising that, as many mourn, control and security have 
replaced ideas of limits and stability at the centre of environmental debates.10 The ecoluddite 
sensibilities of counter-cultural environmentalismevident in the work of Lewis Mumford, Ivan 
Illich, and E. F. Schumacher, for instanceseem harder to sustain as confidence in the 
restorative agency of ecospheric processes in a technospheric reality has weakened (and as 
warnings of ecotastrophe have become mundane).11 Yet, nonetheless, the grip of technological 
determinism on environmental debates is, if anything, becoming stronger as techno-utopian 
narratives displace technophobic anxieties. We see these narratives taking crude shape in the 
Brundtland Commission’s uncomplicated optimism in their 1987 report: a document that 
offhandedly assumes that “new and emerging technologies offer enormous opportunities for 
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raising productivity and living standards, for improving health, and for conserving the natural 
resource base.12 
Thus was ‘win-win’ environmentalism launched, and is now to be found throughout the policy 
literature, in the assumptioninitially one of convenience, but increasingly one of 
convictionthat sustained techno-economic expansion provides the only future path to resolving 
(i.e., paying for) problems resulting from this expansion in the past.13 The prose of industrial 
designer William McDonough pares this message back to its core: “The key to sustainability is 
making the market work for the environment.”14 This ‘ecomodernist’ message rapidly gained 
detail, elaboration, and an audience in a wave of almost breathless publications in the 1990s, in 
which two books under auspices of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development; 
the journalist Gregg Easterbrook’s description of environmental optimism; the report for the Club 
of Rome, Factor Four; and the pulsing (if only partially coherent) manifesto for ‘natural 
capitalism’ by Paul Hawken, Hunter Lovins, and Amory Lovins deserve particular mention.15 
 
In the early years of this new century, the idea that only purposeful technological intervention can 
prevent ecological systems, and by implication the conditions of human life, from continuing to 
deteriorate is becoming spoken as obvious and unproblematic. In the span of only one generation, 
the technology of planetary life-support has ceased to be science fiction and has become 
institutionally thinkable. Buckminster Fuller’s declaration in 1970 that “the universe is a 
comprehensive system of technology” seems less obscure.16 As the shadow of this idea 
lengthensand those of deep ecology withdraw to the few (lucrative) nooks housing ‘authentic 
nature’the central rhetoric of ‘saving earth’ resonates of doing more rather than of doing less, 
as it once did when it rang with the catch-cries of ‘frugality’ and ‘simplicity’.17  “How to Save the 
Earth,” ran the big type on the cover of Time magazine in the lead up to last year’s World 
Summit on Sustainable Development. It continued in more restrained font: “The wild weather is 
a sign of things to come. But fresh ideas and new technology can help us make this a green 
century.”18 The juxtaposition here of fear of an aggravated, wilder earth (especially one more 
unpredictable) and confidence in a ‘new’ kind of technology is instructive, but it does not speak 
to the simple conflict of machine and nature that defined earlier stories of industrialism. Rather, 
the key metaphors are becoming ones of convergence and, even, of transcendence, as was evident 
in the striking illustration by David Bowers in the middle of the magazine where we encounter a 
besuited white male, against Arcadian background, with a convoluted eco-industrial installation 
in place of a brain, releasing flowers out of ‘his’ chimneys and leaves out of ‘his’ waste pipes.19 
 
The technophilic narratives of ecomodernism draw heavily upon the emotional energies 
generated by perception of nature as finite, fragile, and endangeredconditions that greatly 
concentrate aesthetic appreciationto present technological evolution as the vital precondition of 
the continued evolution of life itself. Kevin Kelly’s Out of Control: The new biology of machines 
(1994) is well worth a read in this regard. Kelly, among other things co-founder of Wired 
magazine, is an enthusiastic spectator of the processes of “bionic convergence" by which 
"overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year" producing, “not a world of 
gray steel…. [but, rather] a neo-biological civilization.”20 It seems e.e.cummings was wrong: 
“The realm of the born … and the realm of the made … are becoming one.”21 I find fascinating 
the following passage in which Kelly explains the confidence he drew from visiting the 
Biosphere 2 dome (Bio2)a technologically maintained and ‘autonomous’ living system 
developed in Arizonadespite the widespread verdict that this experiment was a failure whose 
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prime achievement was to re-affirm the vast extent of the gap between ecological and 
technological forms of complexity and autopoiesis: 
  
The nauseating fear that machine technology will replace all living species has subsided in my 
mind. We'll keep other species, I believe, because as Bio2 helps prove, life is a technology. Life is 
the ultimate technology. Machine technology is a temporary surrogate for life technology. As we 
improve our machines they will become more organic, more biological, more like life, because 
life is the best technology for living.... Someday the difference between machines and biology will 
be hard to discern. Yet "pure" life will still have its place. What we know as life today will still 
have its autonomy-it goes by itself, and more importantly, it learns by itself. Ultimate 
technologies, of any sort, inevitably win the allegiance of engineers, corporations, bankers, 
visionaries, and pioneers all the agents who once were thought of as pure life's biggest 
threat.22 
 
Undoing this dense knot of ideas is beyond my patience in this paper, but I do want to draw 
attention to Kelly’s strange reluctance to give up the idea of life’s purity just as he subsumes 
life’s agency and telos within human agency (“we’ll keep other species”) and, in turn, subsumes 
human agency within the agency and telos of liberal-capitalist practices of innovation, 
entrepreurship, and control.  
 
And so, as it was the determinant of modern progress, is (eco)efficiency becoming the 
determinant of latemodern ‘secure-ability’, although it now embraces not only the world of the 
made but also the world of the born. The agents of economic growth are serendipitously 
discovering that they are blood relatives of their old foe, nature and now see only synergies 
between the demands of life and the demands of capital. The ability to read ‘biologic’ as a 
template for technological evolution prefigures the reconciliation of Gaia and device, proclaim 
these prophets of technobiotic futures, a cyborld in which all that is born is also made.23  
Optimistic technologists may welcome this fact and pessimistic environmentalists deplore it, but 
its immutability and its inevitability seem undeniable.  The redundancy of politics here perhaps 
explains why, despite their curved edges, models of these radical futures—in which technology 
has realized “the goal of a world in which resources are fully available to all of humanity,” 
thereby designing out “the age-old failures of war, poverty, hunger, debt, nationalism, and 
unnecessary human suffering” —look uncannily familiar to this critic of an unjust and 
unsustaining present.24 
 
III.  
and trees,poor stars and stones,but never this 
fine specimen of hypermagical 
 
ultraomnipotence.   We doctors know 
 
a hopeless case if—listen:there’s a hell 
of a good universe next door;let’s go 
 
As a statement of facticity technology-as-environment mirrors the face of our increasingly 
technologised world, lending itself mostly to the labours of description and partly to the emotions 
of technophiles and technophobes, with their different but related responses to this fact. Reason 
becomes before all else a technique of cloning, reproducing the present. Action increases. 
Agency weakens. The future becomes transparent. Yet, of course, this is not the end of the 
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matter, and especially not the beginning, because, as a statement of ontology, technology-as-
environment points elsewhere, lighting up puzzlingly good, if neglected, questions about the 
contemporary conditions of our reality-making. These are questions that may help us catch sight 
of universes simultaneously next door and, in this present, impossible to reach. Questions that 
present technology to us, not as object or knowledge or action, but as the site of our encounter 
with that which lies simultaneously beyond us and within us: not as the antithesis of ‘nature’, but 
as the medium through which and in which human and world embrace, inhabiting each other. 
Questions that ask how and why we are building the world that builds us. In what little space that 
remains to me here, I briefly follow the lead of these questions to leave behind the techniques of 
secure-ability and catch sight of different ground in which we may yet build genuinely 
postmodern understandings of sustainability.  
 
If the dualism between human essence and artefact, producer and product, is brought into the 
open as questionable, then the suggestion that technology is environment presents technology as 
surrounding us as a medium of experience. Technology is habitat. It is never simply used; it is 
always inhabited. Technology enwraps us, but not just as a materiality. Technology is an 
experience of epistemological, axiological, and metaphysical embedding. The French sociologist 
Peirre Bourdieu is well-known for his use of the concept of habitus to name the way that "the 
mind born of the world of objects does not rise up as a subjectivity confronting an objectivity," 
but, rather, that "the mind is a metaphor of the world of objects which is itself but an endless 
circle of mutually reflecting metaphors."25 This is the essence of the dynamic of technology-as-
environment: things and thinking, materiality and consciousness are in each and every moment 
and place the product of the other. Their relationality is the precondition of agency.26 
Technology-as-environment names nothing less than the generative reciprocity of self and world. 
It names the human capacity to respond to particular conditions in time and space—social, 
ecological, and cosmological—so as to transform them, projecting forward in time and space 
particular meanings and purposes that reconstitute in unpredictable ways the concrete conditions 
in which, by equally indeterminable processes, new needs and purposes are born.  
 
Technology-as-environment names those composite wholes, those habitats, within which nature, 
people, and their productions belong each to the other. What, then, is to be asked of the 
latemodern habitats in which technology proliferates with apparent autonomy, but where it is 
spoken mostly as an environment without depth or boundaries? What of the environments in 
which technology appears as pre-given facts rather than as the negotiated and partial embodiment 
of particular social meanings and purposes?  
 
Martin Heidegger’s post-war gift to us—which, to be sure, arrives in a package of very mixed 
blessings—is the beginnings of a different saying from within which we come to see how the 
more the technology of control provides answers to the mysteries of our materiality, to the 
mysteries of nature and of culture, the more it itself becomes the foundational mystery of our 
time and place.27 Technology itself becomes uncontrollable. We begin to see how practices and 
words are caught in a historical project in which they function as devices burying from sight the 
dialectical play by which habitat and habitus, world and world-view, experience and reason, 
bring the other into reality. We see, as Heidegger did, the danger of practical forms of insight 
ceasing, of agency itself ceasing, as the activities of instrumental control displace other 
technological possibilities.  
 
We see that the sources of the unsustainability of our age are not to be found in the imperatives of 
control themselves, not in some mindless biological lust for supremacy, but in the particular 
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social practices, the technological habitats, that present our reality as unwelcoming, ungenerous, 
and unforgiving and therefore as demanding of being controlled in the first place. As 
technological change now warms the planet, deadens the soil, and poisons the water, ‘the 
environment’ of ever-escalating risk binds us ever more tightly to technologies promising to 
protect us. The technosphere, technology-as-global environment, is nothing less than the 
performance of a story in which an inherently meaningless, and therefore an inherently 
dangerous, earth must be the wrapped in the purposes of security. The technosphere tells of the 
dialectical interplay of fear of an alien, indifferent reality and rapture in new worlds of 
technology promising safety and, perhaps especially, immortality.  
 
Conversely, the meanings of sustainability are to be found within technological habitats that 
invite entry into a genuine commerce of sustenance, a nourishing embrace, with a reality 
welcoming, generous, and forgiving. The anxieties and raptures bound up in latemodern habitats 
cannot be easily shifted, but they can be more consciously named and observed and, thus, the 
deeper function of technology as reality-building can begin to be narrated and performed with 
greater awareness and practical possibility. If nothing else, the ideal of sustainability has true 
power to the extent that it offers knowledge of how much we cannot yet know that we long to 
know, through which we are paradoxically made whole, integrated, and complete. It is open to 
us, within the technospheric treadmill of danger and deliverance, to experiment with the 
experience of sustenance, shifting our orientation to the technologies around us. To encounter the 
car-dependent city through a bicycle or the global workplace through fidelity to local home-place 
or the news of terrorism without the images of television or the supermarket as a grower of 
vegetables is to encounter latemodern habitats in ways that reveal their unique character—to live 
without television in a world without television is, for instance, a very different encounter than to 
do so in our televisual environment—and that set it vibrating with the possibilities of 
renegotiation. Artefacts can be, and are being, relocated and redesigned in our lives to allow new 
meanings of nurture to be born in us, heralding the time when care will flow more strongly from 
us to our world and from our world to us through the medium of technology.  
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